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1.

INTRODUCTION

The warning bells have been ringing for some time,' but only recently has the

United States begun to realize the enormity of the financial crisis that has enveloped its
economy. 2 The situation, according to critics, has its genesis in the early and middle
* This comment was written during the fall of 2008 at the height of the economic cnsis. Since that time
there have been too many developments to catalogue, including the introduction to Congress of several reform
bills with various provisions that are intended to ensure that such a catastrophe never happens again. To the
extent that these bills incorporate any of the suggestions made herein, it is coincidental. Moreover, please
forgive any outdated phrases, arcane descriptions, or even facts that lack the clarity and currency that might be
expected were this piece composed closer to the time of this issue's publication.
1. Larry Elliott et al., US. Bank Crisis Sparks Panic in Markets, http:/www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/
mar/18/useconomy.marketturmoil (Mar. 18, 2008).
2. Edmund L. Andrews & Graham Bowley, Dow Rises 370 Points as US. Plans Financial Rescue
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parts of the 2000s when rises in housing prices were fueled by low interest rates, creating
an enormous housing bubble in the process.3 This investor-friendly environment fostered
rampant speculation by banks and other lenders and led to an explosion in high risk,
subprime mortgage loans. 4 When the bubble finally burst, "borrowers started to default
on mortgages. As defaults piled up, the complex securities Wall Street had created from
those mortgages began to crumble." 5 In March of 2008, the crisis began affecting major
financial institutions and resulted in an unexpected, international credit crunch. 6 The first
victim of the crisis was the giant investment bank Bear Stearns. 7 Subsequently,
numerous banks, mortgage lenders, and insurance companies have collapsed. Some
institutions such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and American Insurance Group (AIG)
have prompted high profile bailouts by the federal government. 9 Still other companies,
like the aforementioned Bear Steams, have been bought for a pittance by competing
financial institutions who have so far managed to stave off the crisis. 10
While the events of the last few months may seem novel because of their
enormity, 11 it should be remembered that the United States' economy has seen its share
of economic crises, particularly those that have banking at their epicenter. 12 Perhaps
because it stands as one of our more recent examples, the collapse of Penn Square Bank
and the resulting shockwaves that the banking industry absorbed in the early 1980s
makes for an interesting comparison in the very least. 13 There, too, an overvaluation of
collateral 1 4 led to a systemic crisis on a national scale.15 When the value of the collateral
suddenly dropped, or rather, more euphemistically, when there was a "correction" in the
market, Penn Square Bank was suddenly left holding an enormous stockpile of worthless

=slogin
Package, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20/business/economy/20cndleadall.html? -1&hp&oref
(Sept. 19, 2008).
3. Mark Adleson & David Jacob, The Sub-prime Problem: Causes and Lessons 2,
http://www.securitization.net/pdflPublications/Sub-primeProblem_8JanO8.pdf (Jan. 8, 2008).
4. Yuliy Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 6,
http://ssrn.com/abstract-1020396 (Aug. 19, 2008).
5. John Waggoner & David J. Lynch, Red Flags in Bear Stearns' Collapse, http://www.usatoday.com/
money/industries/banking/2008-03-17-bear-steams-bailoutN.htm (Mar. 19, 2008).
6. Elliott, supra n. 1.
7. Waggoner & Lynch, supran. 5.
8. Peter A. McKay, Tumultuous Week Ends in a Rally, http://online.wsj.com/article/
SBl22181849785l56423.html (Sept. 19, 2008). The most prominent retail bank failure to date has been that of
IndyMac. Kathy M. Kristof & Andrea Chang, IndyMac Bank Seized by Federal Regulators,
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-indymac 12-2008jul12,1,7375643.story (July 12, 2008).
9. Tim Harford, Bailouts Are Inevitable, Even Desirable, http://www.slate.com/id/2201343/ (Oct. 4,
2008). Apparently, the government has based its policy on the theory that an implosion of these crucial
financial institutions would have far reaching consequences that would cost both the economy and the
taxpayers more to fix in the future if they were simply allowed to go bankrupt. Id.
10. Waggoner & Lynch, supran. 5.
11. McKay, supra n. 8.
12. George Sutton, Penn Square Bank-20 Years Later: A PersonalRecollection of the Causes and Effects
of the Banking and DepositInsurance Crisis of the 1980s, 27 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 969, 969 (2002).
13. See Mark Singer, Funny Money (Alfred A. Knopf 1985).
14. See FDIC, Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and the RTC Experience 528, http://www.fdic.gov
/bank/historical/managing/history2-03.pdf (last updated Feb. 4, 2004) (Here, the overvaluation was both a
result of market forces and the unscrupulous actions of its own employees.).
15. Alvin C. Harrell, Penn Square Bank-20 Years Later: Introduction to the Symposium, 27 Okla. C. L.
Rev. 945, 945 (2002).
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loans and the federal government quickly forced it into insolvency.16 Although a
relatively small institution, Penn Square Bank's failure had a dramatic effect throughout
18
the country. 17 Hundreds of banks and savings and loans went under in the aftermath.
Many of these institutions had substantial ties with Penn Square Bank through
participation interests that they had purchased in various loans. 19 It was through these
interests that the mistakes of one lender, Penn Square Bank, caused an enormous crisis
for the entire country. 20
It is this article's contention that, in light of the subprime mortgage crisis and its
foundations in historically questionable lending practices (in particular those practices
which involve selling different interests in loans), specific regulations need to be placed
on participatory schemes in order to prevent future failures in the financial marketplace.
It would admittedly be better to attack the heart of the problem, the overvaluation of
collateral, and thus assure that banks always have adequate protection against a debtor's
default. In capitalism, however, supply and demand set the prices and, inevitably, these
two forces are fundamentally wrong in their valuations from time to time. 21 Therefore,
banks should be left alone in their decisions on the value of specific collateral.
Regulations must instead be fashioned both to diffuse the chance that an overvaluation
will hurt the banking industry as a whole and, if possible, to rationally spread out risk so
that it is impossible for one or even several bank failures to adversely affect the entire
nation's economy. This can be accomplished by enacting specific regulations that control
both the circumstances surrounding the creation of participations as well as the
resolution of participatory interests that are held by failed financial institutions.
Part II of this article sketches out the fundamentals of participations and the role
they play in a modern economy. Part III will examine the problems created by the Penn
Square Bank's use of participations and the way the Federal Depositor Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) resolved them in receivership. Part IV will then explore parallels
between the insolvency of Penn Square Bank and the meltdown of the subprime
mortgage industry, ultimately suggesting that these separate crises ultimately stem from
the same regulatory problems and, therefore, suggest similar solutions. Sections V and
VI will provide an overview of the current statutory and case law surrounding bank
participations, paying particular attention to the economic status of participations and
how they are dealt with in insolvency. Moreover, these sections will also suggest several
regulations that, if instituted by Congress, may help prevent or at least mitigate future

16. FDIC, supran. 14, at 533.
17. See Harrell,supra n. 15.
18. Id. at 945.
19. FDIC, supra n. 14, at 531 (noting that some $2.1 billion of interests were owned by other banks on
notes held by Penn Square).
20. See Harrell, supran. 15.
21. Sutton, supra n. 12, at 982 (mentioning in particular the oil and gas boom in the late 70s and early 80s
and the internet boom of the late 90s). Moreover, it bear's repeating that many economic models call for
"perfect information" available to all interested parties in a particular industry before prices can be correctly set
by supply and demand. EconomicExpert.com, Perfect Information, http://www.economicexpert.com/a/
Perfect:information.htm (last accessed May 25, 2010). However valuable these models are in understanding the
behavior of markets, in this author's opinion it cannot be credibly argued that "perfect knowledge" has ever
existed in any industry, especially banking. Therefore, it is questionable whether there can ever be truly
unassailable valuations of collateral that would survive any change in circumstances.
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crises in the banking industry.
II.

PARTICIPATIONS AND THEIR USES

Participations are a vital tool in the banking industry.22 Federal regulations are
such that many small banks cannot finance larger loans by themselves.23 This is due
primarily to lending limits that are tied directly to an institution's capital.24 Rather than
send these loans to a larger bank not realize any profits from such a transaction, a smaller
bank will approach other banks and financial institutions and offer them "participating"
interests in the loans.25 For example, a bank who can only afford to loan $500,000 to a
single customer, Bank A, may enter into a participation agreement with Bank B, who
likewise can only offer $500,000, to loan a customer $1 million total.26 Bank A, as the
originating institution, then becomes the "lead bank" and "services" the loan (i.e.
completes the transaction with the customer, collects the payments, figures the interest,
etc.).27 In exchange for putting up the other half of the money, Bank B would become a
"participant" and would then be entitled to the proceeds earned from the amount that it
28
provided (i.e. a pro rata share of the payments made on the principal and interest).
This practice fulfills several purposes for the originating institution, such as "increasing
the volume of business, diversifying its risks, and in general improving its liquidity;
conversely, those institutions which 'participate' in loans see it as a way to invest
29
profitably with a minimum of cost, effort, and risk."
This relatively simple concept is not immune to problems or abuse. 30
Participations were used heavily by Penn Square Bank3 1 and they were a crucial
component in creating the credit crisis facing our financial markets today.32 Many of the
problems stem from participating banks' reliance on the evaluations and determinations
of the lead bank. 3 3 "[I]t is realistic, particularly when there is a great disparity of size or

22. See Richard T. Nassberg, The Lender's Handbook 43 et seq. (ALI-ABA 1986).
23. William A. Lovett, Banking and FinancialInstitutions Law 159 (5th ed., West 2001).
24. 12 U.S.C. § 84(a) (2009). Currently a bank can loan a single customer an amount not to exceed 15
percent of its capital. Id.
25. Id. It appears that this sort of reasoning, taken to its logical and most extreme end, provided the
inspiration for Penn Square Bank's operations. See Singer,supra n. 13, at 19-22.
26. See generally Nassberg, supran. 22, at 43-46.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Kevin B. Fisher, Loan Participationsand Bank Failures: the Penn Square Decisions, 44 Sw. L.J. 753,
766 (1990) (quoting Drake & Weems, Mortgage Loan Participations:The Trustees Attack, 52 Am. Bankr. L.J.
23, 23 (1978)).
30. See generally Singer, supran. 13.
31. Id.
32. Cf Christopher L. Peterson, Subprime: Lending, Foreclosureand Race: An Introduction to the Role of
Finance,
http://4909e99d35cada63e7f757471b7243
Mortgage
in
Residential
Securitization
be73e53el4.gripelements.com/pdfs/PetersonSecuritizationPrimer.pdf (Oct. 2008).
33. Cf Nassberg, supra n. 22, at 43-44. It is interesting to note that, in the pre-war mortgage market, a
participating bank was generally less reliant on the lead bank's assessments. Saul B. Klaman, The Postwar
ResidentialMortgage Market 196 (Princeton U. Press 1961) ("With little or no uniformity or standardization in
loan contracts, shifting ownership of mortgages among investors was quite limited and expensive. It was based
necessarily upon detailed estimation and appraisal of property, neighborhood, borrower, and loan terms, and
confined to places where the underlying property was located and local investors familiar with economic
conditions.").
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sophistication between the lead and participant banks, to expect that the participants will
rely more heavily upon the lead bank's analysis, decisions, and management of the
transaction . . . ."34 Put more poetically, with participations "[1]iquidity is paramount[,

t]rust flows freely," and disaster may be just around the corner for an unwary
institution.35
Problems are compounded when a participation, instead of following the simple
scheme laid out above, is turned into a commodity. 36 In its most extreme and recent
form, millions of mortgages were "packaged" together, divvied up into pieces, and
offered for sale to speculators on Wall Street as "derivatives". 37 The fundamental idea
remains the same: there is a lead bank and participating banks (or, in other words,
investors) each with a specific interest in the loan. 38 In these more complex systems
where millions or even billions of dollars are changing hands, the utility of participations
are quickly dwarfed by the potential problems they create. 39 The reason is simple: if a
bank makes a bad loan to a home or business owner who then defaults, that bank may
become insolvent.40 If a separate bank owns a participatory interest in the defaulting
loan, then it, too, will suffer adverse consequence. If enough loans go into default for
enough banks, however, the entire system may collapse from the tangled web of
dependency and liability created by such participatory schemes. 4 1 This, in essence, is the
story of Penn Square Bank.
III.

PENN SQUARE BANK: BOOM AND BUST

As with seemingly all banking crises, the crisis following Penn Square Bank's
collapse was a product of its time, a casualty of a cyclical market where rampant
speculation led to unexpectedly large gains (at least for those involved) followed by even
more precipitous losses.42 The story of Penn Square Bank is tied to the oil and natural
gas market of the late 1970s and early 1980s. This market was characterized by fastrising energy prices and increased speculation. 43 When Jimmy Carter's Administration
effectively removed price controls on newly discovered natural gas,44 the price of natural
gas was finally set by the market and the industry became an attractive investment for
34. Nassberg, supra n. 22, at 44.
35. Singer, supra n. 13, at 20.
36. See Christopher L. Peterson, Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role of
Securitization-A hearing before the UnitedStates Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment, http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfmn?
FuseAction=Files.View&FileStore id=4f40elb9-ec5b-4752-ba8f-Ocl4afc44884 (Apr. 17, 2007). Of particular
interest is a confusing chart demonstrating the different interests that various actors may have in a home loan.
Id at 4.
37. Peter S. Goodman, Experts See Need for Punitive Action in Bailout, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/09/23/business/23skeptics.html (Sept. 22, 2008). For a more general definition of a derivative, see SEC,
Mortgage-BackedSecurity, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecurities.htm (last updated June 25, 2007).
38. Fisher, supra n. 29, at 767-768.
39. See generally Richard Y. Roberts & Randall W. Quinn, Leveling the Playing Field: The Need For
Investor Protectionfor Bank Sales ofLoan Participations,63 Fordham L. Rev. 2115 (1994).
40. See generally Lovett, supra n. 23.
41. See Goodman, supra n. 37.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 977.
44. Singer, supra n. 13, at 79.
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banks almost overnight. 45 Both older energy companies as well as many new players
were eager to take advantage of the situation.46 They were all hungry for capital to start
their ventures and Penn Square Bank was eager for their business. 47
The central figure in Penn Square Bank's meteoric rise and collapse was the
colorfully named Beep Jennings, one time manager of the bank who, after a stint as vice
president of another bank, had returned as an owner.48 Jennings knew that Penn Square
Bank was only a small, regional player that was cut-off from making large loans and,
consequently, large profits. 49 Through the pre-existing concept of loan participations,
however, Jennings saw an opportunity to dramatically increase Penn Square Bank's
profile. 50 In a departure from traditional practice, Jennings's scheme called for the lead
bank to become more of a middle-man, someone who facilitated the transfer of money
from a large, "money center" bank to customers of the lead bank. 5 1 The idea was
perfectly captured by Mark Singer:
There was such a creature as a 100-percent loan participation. In this instance the loanoriginating bank had in effect ceased being a bank. It found the borrower and delivered him
into the hands of the big lender, collecting a fee but not retaining any investment in the
loan. For its fee, the originating bank-Penn Square, say-would "service" the loan. The
bank that had bought the loan wanted tangible evidence that the borrower was worth the
risk, and Penn Square had a du% to perfect any secured interest in collateral and to forward
interest payments to the lender.
Nothing about this scheme was or is now illegal. 53
When the price of oil and gas went skyrocketing, Jennings went hunting for big
money partners in his participation scheme. 54 One would think that the largest financial
institutions would "avoid[ ] the temptation to dabble in areas outside their expertise.,55
On the contrary, lured by the promise of high energy prices, large banks such as Seattle
First National Bank, Chase Manhattan, and Northern Trust Company eagerly entered
into participation agreements with Penn Square Bank. 56 With such wealthy and powerful
partners, Jennings was able to quintuple Penn Square Bank's loan portfolio within his
first four years at its helm. 57 At the height of its success and just before its calamitous
fall, Penn Square Bank had approximately $2 billion in loans on its books.58 This
contrasted greatly with the slightly less than $500 million that the bank held in

45. Id
46. Id. at 97 et seq.
47. Id
48. Id. at 16-17.
49. Singer, supra n. 13, at 19.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 19-20.
52. Id. at 20.
53. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System et. al., Interagency Statement on the Sale of 100%
Partcipations,http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/bulletin/97-2 1a.pdf (Apr. 10, 1997).
54. Singer, supra n. 13, at 64.
55. Phillip L. Zweig, Penn Square Bank: The School for Scandal, 27 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 959, 961 (2002).
56. FDIC, supra n. 14, at 528.
57. Singer, supra n. 13, at 66.
58. FDIC, supran. 14, at 527.
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deposits. 59 If not for participations, lending on this scale would not have been possible. 60
The liabilities held by Penn Square Bank, however, were literally less than half the
story. Many of the larger banks who had participated in the loans, known as "upstream
banks", 6 1 held sizeable loan interests that threatened their own stability. 62 For example,
Seattle First National held participations that were worth half of its actual equity. 63
Michigan National's liabilities came closer to 150 percent of its equity.
When considering the sheer numbers, it is not too bold to say that "Penn Square
and its upstream bankers exuded arrogance." 65 Many of these larger banks had bought in
to Jennings' system; they had, in essence, become a part of "a pyramid of belief' 6 6 that
disregarded central tenets of banking such as "[n]ever lend people more money than they
can pay back."67 Towards the end of its existence, Penn Square Bank owned only a
small percentage of the loans that it carried on its books; the majority owners were the
out of state, upstream banks. 68
Moreover, as the quantity of loans increased, there was a systematic decrease in
their quality. 69 The balance sheet at Penn Square Bank had never looked better, 7 0 but
after an audit by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in 1981, the
federal government became very concerned. 7 1 The OCC "found low capital, excessive
low-quality loans, inadequate liquidity, inexperienced staff, increasing problem loans,
and management problems."72 This was not the OCC's first critical report of Penn
Square Bank but rather represented a snapshot of the rapidly deteriorating lending
policies of Jennings and his cohorts. 73 After a previous inspection by the OCC, Penn
Square Bank's directors had been forced to sign an agreement to practice better lending
policies; that is, the directors were tasked with creating better oversight procedures to vet
their prospective borrowers and the collateral that they were offering in support of their
loans. 74 Obviously the warning had not been heeded and, in the summer of 1982, the
75
OCC declared Penn Square Bank a failed institution.
When a bank such as Penn Square Bank fails, the FDIC steps in and acts as its
"receiver." 76 In effect, a receiver "succeeds to the rights, powers, and privileges of the
institution[;]" it is not an exaggeration, then, to say that the FDIC becomes the failed
59. Michael Mitchelson, The FDIC Response to Penn Square Bank and the Local Implementation of
NationalPolicy, 27 Okla. City U. L. 1039, 1042 (2002).
60. Cf 12 U.S.C. § 84(a).
61. Singer, supra n. 13, at 20.
62. Id. at 154-157.
63. Id. at 154.
64. Id
65. Zweig, supra n. 55, at 962.
66. Singer, supra n. 13, at 73.
67. Id at 117.
68. Mitchelson, supran. 59, at 1046.
69. Singer, supra n. 13, at 117.
70. Id. at I12.
71. Id.
72. FDIC, supran. 14, at 528.
73. Singer,supra n. 13, at 112.
74. Id. at 73.
75. Harrell, supra n. 15, at 945.
76. Mitchelson, supra n. 59, at 1039-1040.
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institution.7 7 Invested with such power and authority, it is the receiver's duty to resolve
the failed institution by collecting its assets and distributing them to the institution's
depositors and creditors. 78 Generally, once having formed the receivership, the FDIC has
three methods of dissolving the failed entity and distributing its assets: (1) it either tries
to find a willing buyer who will agree to take on the liabilities of the failed institution in
a "purchase and assumption;" (2) it collects the assets of the institution, liquidates them,
and distributes the proceeds to the bank's depositors and creditors; or (3) it creates a
"bridge" bank to completely take over the failed institution and resume operations in its
place.79 In pursuing one of these three courses, "[t]he FDIC is required by statute to
maximize the return on the assets of the failed bank ... and to minimize any loss to the
insurance fund."8o For this reason, the FDIC much prefers to merge a failed bank with
another institution as this allows it to avoid paying out insured deposits.81 This
preference is especially true for larger institutions whose failure would both cost the
FDIC more to resolve and could possibly disrupt other businesses and the broader
economy on a large scale. 82
Because of the uncertainties flowing from Penn Square Bank's complicated
participation scheme, there was no financial institution in the United States that was
willing to step in and assume the risk of purchasing the assets and assuming the
liabilities of the failed institution. 3 Therefore, the FDIC was forced to structure a pay
out to the bank's depositors and creditors,84 the most unattractive and costly solution. 85
As happens for every method of resolving an insolvent bank, when a payout occurs, the
FDIC is required to act "in the best interests of the receivership." 86 To this end, the FDIC
must follow a highly structured regulatory scheme that calls for certain steps to be taken
to quickly, efficiently, and cheaply dispose of a failed institution. This regulatory
structure determines both how it should sell the assets and how it should pay out the
claims. 88 First, the FDIC pays the administrative costs of the receivership.89 Then, for
every depository account that is equal to or less than the insured limit ($100,000), the
FDIC must pay the depositor in full. 90 The FDIC next turns to the institution's creditors
such as (at least at the time of the Penn Square Bank receivership) those who hold a
participation interest in one of the failed institution's loans. 9 1 These claims are paid out
pro rata from whatever assets remain in the receivership estate, meaning that they
77. FDIC, Resolutions Handbook: Chapter 7-The FDIC's Role as a
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/ch7recvr.pdf (last accessed May 16, 2010).
78. Id.
79. Mitchelson, supran. 59, at 1040-1041.
80. FDIC, supran. 77, at 70.
81. FDIC, supra n. 14, at 529-530.
82. Lovett, supra n. 23, at 139-140.
83. Singer, supra n. 13, at 141.

Receiver

70,

84. FDIC, supra n. 14, at 532.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Lovett, supra n. 23, at 140.
Singer, supra n. 13, at 149.
FDIC, supra n. 77, at 72.
Id
Id.
Id
Id
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generally are not paid out in full.92 Moreover, for those loans that go into default, the
participating bank generally cannot reach the collateral to recover its investment (even
assuming that the collateral would be sufficient to cover their liability).93
In examining the difficulties that the FDIC had when liquidating Penn Square
Bank, it is clear that much of the trouble was caused by the FDIC's ignorance of the
failed institution's specialized market. 94
No one at the FDIC knew how oil-and-gas financing worked; no one acknowledged the
importance of cash flow; no one understood the classic and unavoidable pyramid of the
typical oil-and-gas borrower; no one seemed to care how a loss of credit would damage the
value of collateral. Wherever cash or collateral could be found, the FDIC intended to be at
the head of the line. 95
Thus, with the FDIC's relative inexperience with the type of loans in Penn Square
Bank's portfolio and its insistence on fast and often messy resolutions, it came as no
surprise that the receivership of the failed institution created more problems than it
solved. 96
Understandably, most problems arose when the FDIC began to dispose of the
elusive loans of Penn Square Bank. 97 The FDIC's preferred method of dealing with these
loans was to sell them off, thereby granting another bank the status of lead bank and
converting Penn Square Bank's interest into a liquid asset which they could then use to
pay off the failed institution's creditors.98 However, many difficulties attended the
selling of these loans. 99 To begin with, many other banks held interests in these loans,
thereby making it hard for the FDIC to determine how much interest there was for the
receivership to sell. 10 0 Also, many possible buyers were understandably leery of taking
on the loans of a failed bank. 101 Obviously something went wrong at Penn Square Bank
and no matter how the FDIC packaged the loans, a patina of distrust would stigmatize
them as either being under-performing or based on insufficient collateral.102 Therefore,
for many of Penn Square Bank's loans, the FDIC failed to find a buyer.103
Understandably these unpurchased loans were also the most suspect loans in need of
immediate attention, yet the FDIC refused to renew or reform the borrower's terms,
preferring to allow the loans to slide listlessly into default. 104 This presented many
participating banks with a troubling problem: if they held a participation in a loan that
was not renewed, it could either increase their risk of loss in hopes of recovering their

92. FDIC, supra n. 77, at 71.
93. HiberniaNatl. Bank v. FDIC,733 F. 2d 1403, 1407 (1o Cir. 1984).
94. Singer, supra n. 13, at 149.
95. Id
96. See Fisher, supra n. 29.
97. Id.
98. Charles E. Cheatham, Economic and Regulatory FactorsRelating to Penn Square Bank, 27 Okla. City
U. L. Rev. 1051, 1056-1057 (2002).
99. Singer, supra n. 13, at 141.
100. Id.
101. Cheatham, supran. 98, at 1056.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 1056-1057.
104. Id. at 1057.
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investment by buying the loan outright (which many banks, understandably, were wary
of doing) or write the loss down in its books and hope that they could afford to do so.los
With the projected losses of many of the upstream banks skyrocketing because of the
FDIC's loan policy, lawsuits began flooding into the Western District of Oklahoma. 106
Many of these lawsuits dealt with the concept of the offset.10 7 Traditionally, the
concept of an offset is not difficult. 108 Bank A loans Borrower $10,000 and at the same
time Borrower has $5,000 deposited in Bank A. 10 9 If Bank A goes insolvent, the receiver
is permitted to "offset" Borrower's deposit against his loan; that is, instead of paying out
the $5,000 deposit to Borrower as the receiver would normally be expected to do, it may
subtract said deposit from Borrower's $10,000 debt, thus leaving an amount outstanding
of $5,000 owed by Borrower to the receiver. 10 As one can imagine, this process can
become infinitely more complex when considering a participating bank's interest in the
loan.111
Initially upon encountering this problem with Penn Square Bank, the FDIC simply
offset the deposits of its customers against their corresponding debts.112 Participant
banks complained, claiming that when the FDIC did this, it did not take into account the
participatory interests that other banks owned in the loan; that is, the FDIC did not then
turn around and pay a pro rata share of the offset to banks that had participated in loans
held by the debtor. 113 They claimed that when the FDIC offset the loans, it should turn
around and pay out the proceeds pro rata to the participating banks. 114 These
participating banks argued that they had a specific interest in the loan and, through the
offset, the FDIC was "canceling debt no longer owned by Penn Square . . . .',115 Thus,
rather than getting an amount as close as practicable to their participation interest, they
were given a portion that was significantly less than the amount they were owed.116 The
FDIC rejected this argument and continued with its plan of paying off the participating
These cases
banks pro rata from the realized proceeds of Penn Square Bank's offsets.
105. Singer, supra n. 13, at 155. For example, Michigan National had $200 million in participations, of
which more than half were either losses or anticipated losses. Id.
106. Id. at 155.
107. See Fisher,supran. 29.
108. Id. at 760-761.
109. Id. at 761.
110. Id.
Ill. See generally id
112. Fisher, supra n. 29, at 756.
113. Id. at 756-757.
114. FDIC, supra n. 14, at 535 n. 27.
115. Fisher, supra n. 29, at 757.
116. FDIC, supra n. 14, at 535 n. 27.
117. Id.
Loan participants usually receive their pro rata share of any payments made by a debtor that
augments the receivership estate. The same holds true if the receiver forecloses on and liquidates the
underlying collateral. Loan participations may suffer a loss greater than they would otherwise incur,
however, if the debtors or receivers exercise their right of offset. Because the offset does not
"augment the receivership estate," there are no proceeds to be passed on to the loan participants.
The loan participants are therefore left with general unsecured claims against the receivership estate
for the amounts they have lost as a result of the offset. The general unsecured claims are likely to be
worth far less than the 100 cents on the dollar that direct proceeds or cash is worth.
Id.
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were generally tried before courts that were confused by such complicated concepts. 118
The courts were unable to see the benefit derived by the receivership in the offsets (i.e.,
the FDIC was claiming assets in the offsets that were really the assets of the participating
banks). 1 19 Therefore, many participating banks were unable to get their undiminished
pro rata share from Penn Square Bank's deposits and were forced to write off huge
amounts in losses.120
Unfortunately, no amount of lawsuits were enough to undo the damage that Penn
Square Bank had caused, particularly since the courts were unwilling to question the
FDIC's receivership policies.121 Many of the upstream institutions had over-leveraged
themselves on Penn Square Bank's assurances (and, it may be reasonably said, on their
own lax implementation of due diligence).122 As a result, a huge amount of capital had
been inextricably tied up in Penn Square Bank originated loans. 123 When it proved too
difficult for the participating banks to extricate themselves from this web of lending, the
banking system of the entire country suffered.124 Indeed, Penn Square Bank was just the
tip of the proverbial iceberg when it came to insolvency.125 Soon, a significant number
of the nation's lending institutions had been placed on the FDIC's problem list. 126
This phenomenon proved especially galling for the FDIC which, during the
previous decades, had resolved only about six banks per year throughout the entire
country.127 After Penn Square Bank's demise, however, it wasn't long until banks all
over the country became insolvent.128 In Oklahoma and Texas, the two states where
Penn Square Bank had been the most active, nearly all major banks as well as many
smaller institutions such as savings and loans were forced under by the growing crisis.129
The problems extended far outside of Penn Square Bank's region, as well.130 The largest
financial institution in the Northwest United States, Seattle First National Bank, became
the first major national institution to be adversely affected by Penn Square Bank when it
was forced to merge with BankAmerica Corporation. 13 1 In another region of the country,
Continental Illinois Bank saw their non-performing loans (which mostly turned into
losses) rise by nearly $600 million because of its relationship with Penn Square Bank
and eventually had to close its doors.132 By the end of the crisis, upstream banks had lost
over a billion dollars in loans and the insolvency had become the most expensive in

118. Fisher, supra n. 29, at 837.
119. Id. at 838.
120. Id
121. See id.
122. Singer, supra n. 13, at 154.
123. Id.
124. Harrell, supra n. 15, at 945-946; see also Sutton, supra n. 12 (arguing that changes in the regulatory
schemes controlling savings and loans also played a significant role in the banking crisis of the 1980s).
125. See Harrell,supra n. 15, at 945-46.
126. Singer, supra n. 13, at 153.
127. Lovett, supra n. 23, at 137.
128. Harrell, supra n. 15, at 945.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. FDIC, supra n. 14, at 542.
132. Singer, supra n. 13, at 158.
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United States history.13 3
IV.

PARALLELS TO TODAY: CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS

Like the collapse of Penn Square Bank, the subprime mortgage crisis was created
by extraordinary circumstances. 134 While the effects of subprime lending have just now
begun to be fully felt, 135 it is important to note that no consensus has yet been reached as
to its immediate causes.1 36 In most analyses on the subject, however, the blame falls on a
complicated mixture of public policy, government regulation, and private greed, 13 7 the
same formula that also lies at the heart of the Penn Square Bank saga. 138 Moreover, just
like participations in the Penn Square Bank story, a financial instrument that was meant
to diffuse risk played a major part in exacerbating the subprime mortgage crisis so much
so that it would eventually engulf not only a nation, but the entire world. 139 In trying to
untangle the web of causes, then, this section will sketch out a few factors that, at least in
our present understanding, seem to have played a significant role in the economic
turmoil surrounding the world's credit markets.
A.

PublicPolicy

Some commentators have blamed the public policy of the federal government as
the primary driver of the debacle, pointing to a series of regulations that Congress
enacted over the last few decades. 140 Specifically, many single out the Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) passed in 1977 and later enhanced in the 1990s. This
regulation was spurred through Congress by a wish to substantially grow the number of
homeowners in the country.141 In essence, it attempted to make housing affordable for
people of all economic means by imposing certain restrictions and requirements on
lending institutions.142 For example, the CRA imposed "an affirmative duty [on lending
institutions] to lend throughout the areas from which they take deposits, including poor
neighborhoods." 1 4 3 In pursuit of these ends, as the criticism goes, banks were forced to
find creative ways to finance loans for otherwise uncreditworthy customers who would
never be capable of obtaining a mortgage without this law. 14 Thus, some critics contend
that the rise in use of subprime loans was a direct consequence of these lending
institutions trying as best they could to comply with a government regulation based on

133. Id. at 189.
134. See R. Christopher Whalen, The Subprime Crisis-Cause, Effect, and Consequences,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cf.m?abstractid=l 113888 (Mar. 1, 2008); Adelson, supra n. 3.
135. See Elliott, supra n. 1.
136. Compare Whalen, supra n. 134 with Robert Gordon, Did Liberals Cause the Sub-Prime Crisis?
http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article-did-liberalscausethe-subprime-crisis (Apr. 7, 2008).
137. See Gordon,supra n. 136.
138. See Singer, supra n. 13.
139. See Peterson, supran. 32.
140. See Whalen, supra n. 134; Gordon, supra n. 136.
141. Gordon, supra n. 136.
142. Whalen, supra n. 134, at 3-4.
143. Gordon, supra n. 136.
144. Whalen, supra n. 134, at 4.
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the quixotic if not wholly unobtainable goal of universal home ownership.1 45
This view is not without its detractors.146 For example, President Bush weakened
the CRA in 2001 whereas the boom in the subprime loan industry came later in the
decade. 147 Moreover, many of the subprime loans were not given in order to
accommodate the CRA but were instead creatures of their own circumstances.148 Rather
than too much regulation, then, many critics have argued that there was, in fact, too little
government interest in what was perceivably becoming a much large problem. 14 9 Thus,
instead of blaming a failed initiative of public policy, these critics blame disastrous
choices in our nation's fiscal policy.
B.

FiscalPolicy

For example, critics have highlighted the permissive and anti-regulatory policies of
the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) in the early 2000s as a primary culprit in the federal
government's failure to prevent the crisis.150 After the Dot-Com crash of 2000, the Fed
cut short-term interest rates by 5.5 percent to smooth the correspondingly jittery
economic conditions that followed. 15 1 This historically low rate combined with higher
home values and engendered what is now known as the housing bubble. 152 This bubble
had two effects: (1) it made made real estate mortgages a more desirable commodity to
banks and other lending institutions, and (2) it ensured a steady stream of money for the
countless Americans who wished to take out these mortgages. 15 3 Many at the Fed were
wary of the situation and there was some discussion as to whether the bubble should be
artificially "popped" by raising the short-term interest rate so that the tide of "cheap"
money behind the phenomenon would be stemmed. 154 But the prevailing argument held
that bubbles were unavoidable, perhaps even undetectable, 155 and that the short-term
interest rate should therefore never be used as a tool to pop suspected bubbles. Alan
Greenspan, the Federal Reserve Chairman responsible for the sharp cut in the short-term
interest rates, most succinctly captured the Fed's policy: "If the bursting of an asset
bubble creates economic dislocation, then preventing bubbles might seem an attractive
goal. But whether incipient bubbles can be detected in real time and whether, once
detected, they can be defused without inadvertently precipitating still greater adverse
consequences for the economy remain in doubt." 15 6 Therefore, interest rates remained
145. See id.
146. Gordon, supra n. 136.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Katalina M. Bianco, The Subprime Lending Crisis: Causes and Effects of the Mortgage Meltdown 4-5,
http://www.business.cch.com/bankingfinance/focus/news/Subprime WP rev.pdf (last accessed May 16, 2010).
150. Kara Scannell & Sandeep Reddy, Greenspan Admits Errors to Hostile House Panel,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122476545437862295.html (Oct. 28, 2008).
151. Bianco, supra n. 149, at 4.
152. Id. at 4-5.
153. Peterson, supra n. 32, at 17.
154. Bianco, supran. 149, at 4-5.
155. Tom Petruno, Money & Co.: Tracking the Market and Economic Trends That Shape Your Finances,
Bernanke Suggests a Shift at the Fed on Bubble-busting, http://latimesblogs.1atimes.com/moneyco/2008/10/
imagine-a-bubbl.html (last accessed Oct. 15, 2008).
156. Id.
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low and values in real estate continued their meteoric rise.
C.

Subprime Loans

Whatever the policy backdrop of the past decade may have been, the fact that
subprime loans flourished during the early and middle parts of the decade is
undisputed.1 57 Subprime loans are typically offered to borrowers who have low credit at
higher interest rates than prime loans.158 They accounted for as much as 20 percent of
those mortgages originating in 2006, creating an estimated $600 billion dollars in risky
debt. 159 The attractiveness of these loans to customers was evident; their popularity had
grown to such an extent that, between 2001 and 2007, the average mortgage nearly
doubled.160 Not only were bank customers taking out mortgages to buy new houses, they
were also borrowing against their current residence in the hopes of securing some easy
cash under what they believed to be favorable terms.161 Encouraged by the
unprecedented rise in the housing market, banks and other lending institutions were more
than willing to throw money at people with suspect credit confident that, if the borrower
were to default, the value of the home would more than compensate the bank for the lost
payments.162 In this way, borrowers who in leaner times would have been denied a loan
easily qualified under these relaxed lending standards.
D.

Derivatives

In addition to the government policies and runaway lending that fueled this
housing bubble, financial instruments also played a major role in spreading out the threat
that these subprime loans represented.163 As is obvious from an analysis of the Penn
Square Bank affair, the fallout from an institution's improvident loans spreads much
more quickly when other institutions also hold an interest in these bad positions.164 This
is why, perhaps more than anything else, many critics point to a relatively new financial
product, the derivative, when trying to allocate blame for the present credit crunch. 165
Derivatives are often relegated to the realm of the esoteric as a super-complicated
financial instrument that works in ways beyond easy comprehension,166 but a basic
understanding of their place in the economy and how they operate is essential to
understanding the current situation. Essentially derivatives are what participations were
to Penn Square Bank; they were a tool that created lending relationships between various
institutions, a device whose primary goal was the spreading of risk, and an instrument
that, in the end, has tied the whole financial industry together with too many toxic assets,
157. See Demyanyk, supran. 4.
158. InvestorWords.com, Subprime Loan, http://www.investorwords.com/6940/subprime_1oan.html (last
accessed May 25, 2010).
159. Bianco, supra n. 149, at 6.
160. Demyanyk & Hemert, supra n. 4, at 6.
161. Id. at 8.
162. Peterson, supra n. 32, at 17.
163. See Peterson, supra n. 32.
164. See Singer, supran. 13.
165. See Jesse Eisinger, The $58 Trillion Elephant in the Room, http://www.portfolio.com/views/columns/
wall-street/2008/10/15/Credit-Derivatives-Role-in-Crash (Oct. 15, 2008).
166. See id.
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crippling a fragile economy underneath its own weight. 167 Warren Buffet, the respected
financial guru, surely recognized this when he famously referred to derivatives as
1 68
"financial weapons of mass destruction."
Unlike a simple participation where the transaction is essentially limited to a lead
bank and a participant, a derivative can have many players who enter at different times
during the life of a loan. 169 There is, of course, an originating institution; i.e. someone
must still go out, find potential borrowers, and draw up the loan's terms and
conditions.170 In the case of participations, the originating institution retains the right to
service these loans; this has not always been the case with derivatives. 17 1 Many times,
the originating bank will simply assign the loan to another entity, reserving no ownership
interest for itself at all. 172 Thus, the originator merely takes a finder's fee and then
quickly moves on to find another borrower to do the same, ultimately unconcerned with
the performance of the loan sold. 173
After a purchaser has corralled enough loans, it will then "pool" together many
74
similar notes and put them into a special purpose vehicle (SPV).1 Each SPV will then
be divided up into "tranches," or, in other words, "securities backed by a pool of cashproducing assets." 1 75 These tranches will next be given ratings by a credit agency so that
they can go out on the market as securities.176 The highest ratings will typically go to
those tranches that are the safest bets; that is, those tranches that are comprised of the
loans' principle and are therefore directly secured by collateral. 177 These tranches, in
theory, are the least likely to encounter any problems.178 In contrast, those tranches tied
to the interest of the loans will understandably have the lowest ratings since, if any of the
loans in the pool go into default, the expected income from interest payments will
79
necessarily go down and the tranche will depreciate in value.1 After the tranches are
assigned a credit rating, they are ready to be offered on the market where they can be
bought by other lending institutions, corporations, mutual funds, or any other
organization or individual who is looking to invest in what at first seems to be a
diversified, risk-limiting instrument. 180
Like in Penn Square Bank's case, many smaller institutions (as well as larger ones)
were seduced by the prospect of lending out far more than they traditionally could by

167. See id.
168. Dan Weil, Rebuilding the House of Cards: What's the Future for Much-Maligned Derivatives?
http://www.thebigmoney.com /articles/making-bail/2008/1 0/15/rebuilding-house-cards (Oct. 15, 2008).
169. See Peterson,supra n. 32, at 13.
170. Id. at 13.
171. Id. at 15.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 17.
174. Peterson, supra n. 32, at 14.
175. Eisinger, supran. 165.
176. Peterson, supra n. 32, at 14-15.
177. Id. at 10.
178. Id.
179. Id. Much has been said about the culpability of the rating agencies in the current crisis, but such a topic
is beyond the scope of this comment.
180. Id. at 17.
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assigning loans to an eager, securitizing institution.181 By claiming origination fees and
then writing the loans off their books, these banks and lending institutions had to then
continue lending in order to remain profitable.182 Although home ownership increases
almost every year, there was by no means an endless supply of credit-worthy individuals
looking for a mortgage. 183 Therefore, lending institutions had to look to more risky
borrowers to fill their quota.1 84 Securitizing institutions didn't seem to mind. 185 As they
saw it, real estate prices were going up astronomically; 186 any defaults would be cured
by the value of the borrower's collateral and, if it was not, the tranches were sufficiently
diversified to prevent any major disruption in their value. 18 7 Therefore, the utilization of
this new tool created a massive incentive for lenders to take more risks.188 Some CEOs
were even criticized when they restrained their companies from acquiring or creating
derivatives. 18 9 According to the reasoning of the marketplace, there was just too much
money to be made and if your company was not taking advantage of derivatives,
somebody else was and would eventually run you out of business. 190 Ironically, rather
than protecting their companies, the CEOs who accepted this reasoning ensured their
institution's demise when the housing bubble burst and the collateral that secured the by
now ubiquitous derivatives plummeted in value, leaving little to be recouped by investors
once mortgages started going into default.191
V.

CONNECTING THE DOTS: PARTICIPATIONS AND DERIVATIVES

In many important ways, a derivative is not the same financial instrument as a
participation. 192 A participation is usually purchased from the originating institution193
whereas a derivative is most commonly purchased from a securities underwriter who
obtained the loans from various originating institutions. 194 Also, derivatives are a
"package" of loans, not merely an interest in one particular transaction.1 95 Moreover, for
the preceding reasons, it is much more unlikely that the purchaser of a derivative would
have any substantive knowledge with respect to the loans that make up his or her
investment.196 Conversely, the purchaser of a participation can (and should) pursue his
19 7
own due diligence in vetting the transaction underlying its investment.

181. Peterson, supra n. 32, at 16.
182. Id. at 17.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 15
186. See Bianco, supran. 149, at 6.
187. Peterson, supra n. 32, at 16.
188. Id. at 17.
189. Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached Tipping
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/05/business/05fannie.html?_r=1l&hp&oref-slogin (Oct. 5, 2008).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Compare Peterson, supra n. 32, with Nassberg, supra n. 22, at 43.
193. Nassberg, supra n. 22, at 43.
194. See Peterson,supra n. 32, at 15.
195. Eisinger, supra n. 165.
196. See id.
197. Nassberg, supra n. 22, at 43.
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Despite these differences, there are several similarities which suggest that these
two instruments belong to the same genus. Under this theory, a derivative merely
represents a more advanced iteration of a participation rather than a separate instrument
altogether.1 98 For example, both concepts share similar goals: they allow issuers to
spread out risks, originators to lend more than they otherwise could, and purchasers to
invest in loans that otherwise would not be available to them. 199 Furthermore, at their
very heart, both participations and derivatives are offered and purchased on the same
rationale; that is, all parties accept the fact that there is an underlying, secure collateral to
the transaction that effectively insulates all parties from risk.200 Under both concepts,
then, an investor is simply purchasing an interest in a secured loan. 20 1 A derivative
merely represents a "slice," or tranche, representing an interest in a "pool" of loans rather
than an interest in an undivided percentage of a single loan.202 Such a concept makes it
easier for investors to assess the relative worth and risk involved, at least in theory.
Tranches with higher ratings are more trustworthy, lower rated tranches are obviously
more risky.203 In other words, with derivatives, the lead institution offers investors a
choice in how they might wish to participate in a series of loans. 204
The turmoil that the housing bubble and the diffusion of derivatives have caused is
easily recognizable today.205 Some of the giants in the financial industry, overleveraged

on bad investments, have fallen, creating a vacuum where there was once readily
available credit.206 Just as Penn Square Bank failed when a fluctuating market left it with
unpaid loans and significantly overvalued collateral, so, too, did many modem
institutions fail on the mistaken notion that real estate and housing prices could never
depreciate in value.207 AIG, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stems, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and a host of others both large and small have disappeared by either taking the
ignominious route of insolvency or, if they were somewhat luckier, by being acquired by
another company (or the federal government) for pennies on the dollar.208 Such highprofile failures have rocked people's confidence in the world's economy209 and many
commentators are relatively certain that the world is currently in a recession that could

198. See 12 CFR 360.6 (where the FDIC treats participations and securities (i.e., derivatives) the same for
purposes of receivership regulation).
199. See Lovett, supra n. 23, at 159; Eisinger, supran. 165.
200. See Singer, supra n. 13; Peterson, supra n. 32.
201. See Singer, supra n. 13; Peterson, supran. 32.
202. See Peterson, supran. 32.
203. Id. at 10.
204. Id.
205. Matt Krantz, Stocks End Rollercoaster Session Mixed; Dow Has Worst Weekly Drop Ever,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id-6007613&page=1 (Oct. 13, 2008).
206. McKay, supra n. 8.
207. See Duhigg, supra n. 189.
208. McKay, supra n. 8.
209. Id. This is readily observable by looking at the various stock markets around the globe and their
performance during the latter part of 2008. Krantz, supra n. 205. During one week, the Dow Industrial Average
lost nearly 18 percent of its value; the European and Asian markets have not fared any better. Id. More
importantly, perhaps, Libor, the indicator that determines the interest rate charged internationally for inter-bank
lending, has risen to as high as 4.82 percent, a marked increase from the days before the crisis.The Economist,
A Painful Job to Do, http://www.economist.com/world unitedstates/displayStory.cfn ?story_id-12583077
&source-featuresbox main (Oct. 18, 2008).
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last until the end of the 2010.210
This retelling of what some might consider tired stories of boom and bust is not
meant to highlight the moral flaws of the businessmen who helped dismantle their
respective institutions or the greed of investors who bet on banks and bubbles and went
down with them.211 It is only meant to point out that a financial crisis cannot be reduced
to heartless CEOs utilizing new, get-rich quick schemes that eventually leave tax-payers
footing the bill when the gig is up.212 Several factors led to Penn Square's failure: had
the deregulation of gas prices and the energy crisis never occurred, there never would
have been a corresponding spike in oil and gas prices, Jennings would never have been
able to find backers for his loans, and upstream banks would have never become
involved for lack of investment potential. 2 13 Analogously, "the sub-prime problem could
not have happened without the housing bubble which, in turn, could not have happened
without the Federal Reserve's accommodative interest rate policy of the early 2000s."214
In a world that is said to be ruled by supply and demand, bubbles are going to
occur.215 These bubbles, fueled by reckless speculation, will inevitably bring some
investors and even some banks down when they burst.216 Concepts such as the
participation and the derivative, however, dramatically increase the risk that such an
event will spread throughout the financial sector, leading to a system-wide paralysis that
could reach an emergency reminiscent of the Depression.217
The accounts of both Penn Square Bank and the subprime crisis serve another
purpose as well. With the enormity of the problems that such suspect activities create, it
is very easy to lose one's perspective when it comes to finding a solution.218 As in most
financial crises, an instinctual reflex causes the public to blame those most closely
associated with the fallout219 and ignore the symptoms that preceded the crisis.220 Once
the "bad guys" have been punished, it is believed that prosperity and equilibrium will
magically reappear. Penn Square Bank teaches us that this line of reasoning will not
prevent future crises from appearing; after all, here we are again in much the same
position.221 The solution to the problem lies somewhere beyond punishing a few bad
apple bankers who recklessly bet their deposits on shady schemes (though to be sure,

210. The Economist, Wolves at the Door: Financial Mess and Gathering Recession Dominate Barack
Obama's Economic Agenda, http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfin?story_id=12551926 (Nov. 6, 2008).
211. See Singer, supra n. 13.
212. Goodman, supra n. 37. A quick search of the web reveals just such a sentiment welling up in response
to the $700 billion bailout being orchestrated by the federal government.
213. See generally Singer, supran. 13.
214. Adelson, supra n. 3, at 2.
215. Sutton, supra n. 12, at 982.
216. See e.g. Singer, supra n. 13.
217. Cf id.
218. Nina Easton, Main Street Turns Against Wall Street, http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/26/newsleconomy/
(last updated Sept. 28,
eastonbacklash.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2008092810&erefrss-topstories
2008).
219. Id
220. See Adelson, supra n. 3, at 2.
221. Zweig, supra n. 55, at 960. In regards to preventing future crises, two phenomena, one old and one new,
make this difficult if not impossible. First, ". . . trouble always comes through the window you are not
watching." Second, ". . . the investigative resources of our nation, both governmental and media [sic] are
stretched perilously thin." Id.
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some punishment is warranted). We should instead turn our attention to the fact that
Penn Square Bank and the current crisis were grossly exagerated by financial
instruments that were gobbled up by institutions either unaware or uninterested in the
underlying collateral and the lead bank's ability to make sound lending decisions.
Therefore, regulations should be promulgated to control the formation and oversight of
such unpredictable transactions. Moreover, it is evident that existing receivership
regulations are not sufficient to manage the losses of upstream banks when a lead bank
222
fails and they, too, should be modified accordingly.
VI.

REGULATING RISK SHARING

Participations and derivatives are both presently ineluctable parts of the American
financial system. 223 In factm the benefits of such concepts are palpable. 224 Both
instruments allow a bank to lend to credit-worthy borrowers who are seeking a loan in
excess of what that bank may be capable of financing under federal regulations.225 This
ability means increased profits for a bank where otherwise there would be none.226
Moreover, that bank can maintain a relationship with its local clientele and not lose
business to larger banks with more capital on-hand.227 These instruments also help banks
that share fractional interests in the loan, giving them access to investments and profits
that would not be available under normal circumstances.228 Banks are therefore able to
diversify their loan portfolios by lending outside of their traditional regions, thereby
effectively insulating themselves from the risk of being too concentrated in any one
geographic area or industry. 229
As this article has endeavored to show, however, any instrument that shares debt is
capable of bringing this country's economy to its knees.230 Many banks and other
lending institutions have consistently abused this concept of reaping increased revenues
from the servicing of loans while enjoying the benefits of not having to count said loans
against their federally regulated capital requirements. 2 31 Such overreaching has often led
to gaudy profits in the past.232 This, in turn, has compelled banks to begin lending at
increased levels.233 In such circumstances, the more borrowers that such an institution
finds, the more income it realizes. 234 Institutions that no longer make money off of loans
in the traditional sense (that is, they no longer counts on the steady repayment of the
222. See Fisher, supra n. 29. Unlike other suggested reforms, this Article will not pass on the soundness of
ideas such as creating a transparent market for derivatives trading or banning the instrument altogether. See e.g.
US. Pushes Ahead with Derivatives Regulation,
David Cho & Zachary A. Goldfarb,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/13/AR2009051302393.html (May 14, 2010).
223. Lovett, supra n. 23, at 159.
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. See Singer, supran. 13, at 20.
227. Cf Lovett, supra n. 23, at 158-159.
228. Cf id.
229. Id.
230. See Singer, supra n. 13; Peterson, supran. 32.
231. Peterson, supra n. 32, at 17.
232. Eisinger, supra n. 165.
233. Peterson, supra n. 32, at 17.
234. Id.
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loan's principal along with the profit-bearing interest 235) become lending factories,
deriving profit from the generation of loans while leaving others to profit from the loan
itself.236 The originating institutions quickly lose interest in closely scrutinizing the
quality of a borrower's credit or the value of a loan's underlying collateral. Moreover,
the originating institutions no longer care about what happens to a loan after it has been
made in such a scheme; whether a loan is paid off or goes into default, for an originating
institution, the results are the same.237
Presently, there are few regulations that govern the use of participations and even
fewer restricting derivatives. The only direct restraint on a national bank's lending is that
imposed by its own capital. Federal regulations prohibit a bank from lending more than
15 percent of its unimpaired capital to one borrower. 238 This amount may be augmented
by a further 10 percent if those amounts over the standard limit are fully secured by some
form of collateral (i.e., the value of the loan is no more than 100 percent of the value of
the collateral). 239 This regulation is actually intended to force banks into financial
partnerships such as participation agreements by preventing small banks from lending
out too much to one individual.240 As we have seen time and again, however, it is not
sufficient in and of itself to prevent the over-leveraging of financial institutions.
In order to prevent risky and ungovernable loans, two regulatory additions should
augment the current regulations that tie a bank's loans to its capital reserves. First,
federal banking laws should require an originating institution to retain at least a nominal
interest in the loan for the loans entire term. The percentage could be set as low as 5
percent or even as high as 15 percent. While a flat percentage is enviable over no
retention requirement at all, a more helpful model would include a sliding scale. For
those loans that represent the least amount of risk, the originating institution would be
able to sell or assign a larger portion of the loan. Conversely, a loan such as a subprime
mortgage would require the bank to own a higher percentage of interest and thus a higher
percentage of the risk.
Whatever methodology the regulation employs, such a requirement would help
banks meet two critical goals. First, because it is keeping an interest in the loan, the bank
will have a greater impetus to lend to credit-worthy individuals. Gone would be the days
where an institution simply gathered its finder's fee and packaged the loan off along with
the risk to a buyer who has no first-hand knowledge of the collateral or the borrower.
Faced with the reality of losing even a relatively small percentage of a loan, a bank will
be more hesitant to engage in risky lending activity. Second, the regulations will require
an originating bank to have an interest in the loan for its entire life-span, thus ensuring a
close connection between lender and borrower that will better allow for the monitoring
and adjusting of the loan over time.
The second new regulation should affect the rules regarding a bank's acceptance of
collateral. Rather than having a pure value for value ratio between the collateral and the
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

Id.
See Singer, supra n. 13, at 19.
Peterson, supra n. 32, at 17.
12 U.S.C. § 84(a).
12 U.S.C. § 84(b).
Lovett, supra n. 23, at 159.
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loan, there should be a requirement that the collateral exceed in value the amount of the
loan. A small 5 or 10 percent overage would protect banks against a foreseeable
depreciation in the value of the collateral. The FDIC, however, should have the power to
raise this percentage for any class of collateral that exhibits a marked increase. Thus, if
the increase turns into a bubble which later bursts, the risk that the collateral's value
would not cover the amount left outstanding on the loan would be greatly diminished.
This flexibility will also help prevent bubbles since a rise in a bank's risk will
doubtlessly encourage it to rein in any suspect lending. This would mean the death knell
for "no money down" loans for cars, homes, or other large purchases, but judging from
the problems recently associated with these products, such an outcome may not be
completely undesirable.
VII. REGULATING RECEIVERSHIPS

The preceding regulations are designed to give banks and other lending institutions
some faith that, when they become involved in a lead bank's transaction, they will run
the same risks as the lead bank. This should be a bedrock principle for transactions that
by their very nature spread risk and, correspondingly, the participating banks should be
paid pro rata from any collected proceeds from the borrower's payments. Moreover, if
the loan should go into default, they should share in the profits derived from the sale of
the loan's underlying collateral. Finally, this principle should also be enshrined in the
duties of a receiver if and when the lead bank itself goes into insolvency.
In such situations, by allowing participating banks to realize as much return on
their investments as possible, it will be more likely that they themselves will not
succumb to the same fate as their business partner, the lead bank. In the subprime
mortgage crisis, it is still too soon to determine how participating banks will fair under a
lead bank's receivership. If the chaos that resulted from Penn Square Bank's receivership
proves prescient, it is probable that they will not fare well.241 Therefore, there should be
new regulations that will ensure that participating banks are able to minimize their losses
no matter what the circumstances of the lead bank might happen to be. Such regulations
will help keep localized crises from spreading too far beyond their epicenter and will
keep investors calm in times of economic uncertainty.
Several relatively recent regulations have gone a long way to curing some of the
defects that have previously marred the receiverships of lead banks. 24 2 The first change
involves the Uniform Commercial Code's (UCC) Article 9 dealing with secured
transactions. Traditionally, loan participations or assignments have not enjoyed the status
of a secured investment.243 Under the current revision of Article 9 (enacted in all 50
states), a security interest includes, "[a] sale of an account, chattel paper, a promissory
note, or a payment intangible." 244 Such transactions would "include[ the] sale of a right

241. See supra pt. 111.
242. See Frank H. Reeves, Bank Loan Participationsunder the FederalDeposit Insurance Act and Revised
Article 9, 119 Banking L. J. 174 (2002).
243. HiberniaNatl. Bank, 733 F. 2d at 1407.
244. U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (2002).
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in [a] receivable, such as a sale of a participation interest." 245 According to the UCC, if a
participating bank ensures that the participation is in writing and "perfected," it will then
have a secured interest in the loan.246 It is not within the scope of this article to explain
the relatively complicated process of participation securitization, but it should suffice to
say that many participations are now secured interests.247 This new distinction is
important in that it allows participants to go to the head of the line in the event of a lead
bank's insolvency.248 No longer are they relegated to the status of a general creditor as
they typically were before this new regulation, therefore ensuring that they run
substantially less risk of not recouping their investment. 249
To further this end, the Federal Government has drafted § 360.6 in Article 12 of
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).250 Under the Federal Deposit Insurer's Act, the
FDIC has the power of disaffirming or repudiating contracts that are held by an insolvent
bank in order to administer the receivership as effectively as possible.251 Section 360.6,
however, expressly forbids the FDIC from exercising this power to "reclaim, recover, or
recharacterize as property of the institution or the receivership any financial assets
transferred by an insured depository institution in connection with a securitization or
participation."252 Therefore, participant banks are now assured that the FDIC, acting in
its power as a receiver, will not do anything to detrimentally affect their interest in a
loan. 253
Despite these positive changes in the treatment of participations, there may still be
refinements that the FDIC can make that will further ensure that a participating bank
realizes a significant, if not total, return on its investment. This is especially true when
the participant has relied on a lead bank's faulty or fraudulent determinations. First, if a
loan is in danger of going into default or is, in fact, already there, the FDIC should
determine whether the instrument can be reformed so that the borrower may continue to
make payments.254 The FDIC has been slow to pursue this path in the past;255 instead, it
has long been the FDIC's settled policy to resolve an insolvent bank as quickly as
possible. It should finally be apparent, however, that such a policy does not adequately
protect the banking system as a whole. 256 Foreclosed properties and unnecessary bank
loses are, as the subprime mortgage crisis bears out, recipes for disaster.257 Therefore,
245. Id. at § 9-109 n. 5.
246. Id. at § 9.
247. See Reeves, supra n. 242.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. 12 U.S.C. 1821(e) (2009).
252. 12 C.F.R. 360.6(b) (2000).
253. See Bank of N. Y v. FDIC,508 F. 3d I (D.C. Cir. 2007). This is the only case that has utilized this new
regulation. A trustee for participant banks sued the FDIC in its capacity as a receiver for an insolvent bank.
Essentially, it claimed that the FDIC's disregard of an acceleration clause in the notes constituted a repudiation.
The court ruled that it did not. Id.
254. See Jeanne Sahadi, Indymac Borrowers to Get Relief, http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/20/real estate/
fdic indymac mods/index.htm (Aug. 20, 2008). The FDIC is currently experimenting with reforming loans in
its receivership for Indymac Bank. Id.
255. See Cheatham, supran. 98, at 1056.
256. See generally Singer, supra n. 13.
257. See Bianco,supra n. 149.
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the FDIC should create an entity into which it might transfer some of these "toxic" assets
that no other bank or institution is willing to buy and service. This entity, acting as a lead
bank, may then reform the troubled instruments so that the borrower will have a fair
chance of keeping his property and the participant might be able to realize a return. This
policy would require that the special entity buy the insolvent bank's portion of the loan
so that it may be liquidated with the rest of said bank's assets. While such a cost is surely
not welcomed by the FDIC,2 58 it would seem to be far more preferable (as well as more
affordable) than bailing out financial institutions once the crisis has spread beyond
containment.259 With this interest disposed of, the FDIC would be free to wrap up the
receivership as quickly as it wishes. The interests of the participating banks would still
be secure, but now the burden of servicing the loan and, if necessary, liquidating the
collateral, would be placed on this new entity. While this will not completely eliminate a
participant's losses (when, for example, a borrower goes into default and the underlying
collateral proves to be undervalued), it may significantly lower them.
Another possible refinement could lie in the FDIC's treatment of the offset.
Hibernia Nat. Bank v. FDIC., a case arising from the Penn Square Bank debacle,
provides a typical example of the FDIC's standard operating procedures when dealing
with offsets.260 Hibernia very clearly rejects the notion that participating banks are
entitled to a pro rata share of any offset that a receiver secures for a borrower.261 There
the court held that "an offset is not a payment but merely a setting-off against the loan of
previously established credits .... Moreover, "such an offset is insufficient to establish a
fund which the claimant may call its own."262 The concept is more fully fleshed out in
an earlier case which provided Hibernia's rationale, FDIC v. Mademoiselle.263 In
Mademoiselle, the court determined that a participant may only share in the offset if
there was an "augmentation of the bank's assets."264 When a receivership eliminates or
reduces a debt by offsetting the borrower's deposits, that banks assets are reduced but the
receivership is no longer bound to paying out the borrower's insured deposits.265 In
practice, this means that a participant is almost never allowed to recoup funds from the
offset. 2 66
To avoid such confusion with offsets, it should be the settled policy of an FDIC
receivership that all participating institutions are qualified to receive a pro rata share of
any offset provided certain conditions are met. Such formalities as "augmentations"
should be ignored and, in keeping with the fact that many participations now hold the
status of a secured interest, an offset should be available as a source from which a

258. Here it should be noted that, among payees, the FDIC stands at the head of an insolvent institution's
line so that it is assured to receive recompense for its administrative costs before any other depositor or creditor
is paid. FDIC, supra n. 77, at 72. Therefore, I would foresee the entity that is set up to deal with toxic assets as
having its own operating budget that would ideally be financed by the profit it is able to turn on the loans.
259. See Daniel Gross, The Bailout Will Be a Bargain,http://www.slate.comlid/2195308/ (July 14, 2008).
260. HiberniaNail. Bank, 733 F. 2d 1403.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 1408.
263. FDICv. Mademoiselle, 379 F. 2d 660 (9" Cir. 1967).
264. Id at 666.
265. Id.
266. Id.
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participant can look to limit or eliminate its losses. This right, however, should only arise
when it is clear that the participating institutions will not be able to recoup their
investment from the loan itself (i.e., from payments made by the borrower). Thus, the
FDIC would have to act swiftly in evaluating the soundness of an insolvent institution's
loans. It should then sell the healthy loans, reform the salvageable loans, and allow
participants a pro rata share of the offset for those loans which are beyond hope.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The banking industry is integral to our economic system. 2 67 Without it, small
businesses would be unable to prosper, large corporations would not be able to exist, and
most -Americans would never be capable of buying a home. 26 8 The invention and
utilization of credit, which some laud as the most important financial concept ever
conceived, has allowed all of this.269 This system does not, however, come without its
problems.270 As banks have evolved from simple, regional depository and lending
institutions into corporations in search of ever-swelling bottom lines, the risks to our
financial system and economy have grown exponentially. Ironically, rules and
instruments that are intended to spread and diffuse these risks have also been shown to
possess the ability to do grave damage to our entire banking industry.271 Therefore,
remedial regulations such as those set out in this article should be enacted to ensure that
no future bubble or pricing irregularity causes another Penn Square Bank or subprime
mortgage crisis and brings this country and its economy to a grinding halt.2 72
Our country has an enormous faith in our banks, but when these institutions begin
taking risks that threaten not just their own existence but also the financial stability of
their customers, the government should step in to reestablish the public's good will.
Regulations such as those described above should be promulgated with an eye towards
limiting both the risks that customers take when depositing their money or taking out a
loan as well as the risks that banks take while facilitating such actions. If there are too
many Penn Square Banks or subprime mortgage crises, it is not inconceivable that a
system designed to facilitate and grow wealth will end up destroying the very fabric of
our economy, the faith and good-will of the American people who depend on it.
-Jared M Burden
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